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Religious Affiliation and Attendance Among
Immigrants in Eight Western Countries:
Individual and Contextual Effects
FRANK VAN TUBERGEN
This study examines the religious affiliation and participation of immigrants from a large-scale, comparative
perspective. I propose a “specific migration” framework, in which immigrants’ religiosity is an outcome of
both individual characteristics and contextual properties related to immigrants’ country of origin, country of
destination, and combinations of origin and destination (i.e., communities). I use notions discussed in the religion
and migration literature that fit into this scheme. To test these ideas, I collected and standardized 20 existing
surveys on immigrants in eight Western countries, yielding about 38,000 immigrants. Applying multilevel models,
I found, among other things, that: (1) immigrants from countries with higher levels of modernization express lower
levels of religious commitment; (2) immigrants in religious countries are more religious themselves; and (3) the
well-documented higher levels of religious commitment among women is not generalizable to immigrants.
Within the sociology of religion, surprisingly little large-scale empirical research has been
done on immigrants. One reason for doing such a study is that immigration flows increased
dramatically in many Western societies after World War II. Currently, immigrants and their
offspring make up a sizable part of Western populations, and their religious practices contribute
to the religious profiles of these countries (Smith 2002). However, the study of the religion of
immigrants has been hampered by the availability and quality of data (Ebaugh and Chafetz 2000;
Warner and Wittner 1998; Yang and Ebaugh 2001a). Several studies have focused exclusively
on the religion of a single immigrant group, such as Greeks (Veglery 1988) or Koreans (Hurh
and Kim 1990) in the United States. Other studies have been restricted to immigrants within a
specific religion, such as Nelsen and Allen’s (1974) study of Catholic immigrants in the United
States. More recently, several small-scale studies on immigrants’ religion have been conducted
in specific regions of the United States. Examples of these include the “Religion, Ethnicity, and
New Immigrant Research” project carried out in Houston, Texas (Ebaugh and Chafetz 2000;
Yang and Ebaugh 2001b), and the ethnographic case studies of the “New Ethnic and Immigrant
Congregations” project (Warner and Wittner 1998).
In this study, I describe and explain the religiosity of immigrants from a large-scale, compar-
ative perspective. I develop a “specific migration” framework, in which the religion of immigrants
is an outcome of individual and contextual effects. I use notions discussed in the literature that
fit into this scheme. Despite the apparent lack of nationally representative survey data on the
religion of immigrants, I was able to collect 20 such surveys for eight Western countries: Aus-
tralia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United States.
I standardized and pooled these surveys into a single cross-national data set and examined two
aspects of religiosity: religious affiliation (whether people think of themselves as members of a
religious community, denomination, or religion), and religious participation (the frequency with
which people attend religious meetings). I test the hypotheses with multilevel techniques and
control for survey effects.
Frank van Tubergen is Assistant Professor at the Department of Sociology, Utrecht University, Heidelberglaan 2, 3584
CS, Utrecht, The Netherlands. E-mail: f.vantubergen@fss.uu.nl
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THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
In this article, I suggest a specific migration framework, in which immigrant religiosity is an
outcome of four kinds of factors. To begin with, there are correlates to religion at the individual
level (“individual” factors). The religion literature has documented a number of “empirical regu-
larities” at the individual level, including such factors as age, sex, education, and marital status.
These patterns have been observed earlier among native, Western populations, and the strategy
of this study is to examine theoretically and empirically whether these individual-level factors
equally apply to the immigrant populations.
Next to individual factors, different kinds of contextual factors could also play a role in the
religiosity of immigrants. One possibly important context is the country of origin. Immigrants
originate, by definition, from a certain country, and characteristics of their home country could
play an enduring role in their religious practices in the destination country. These characteristics
include the degree of modernization of immigrants’ home country, and the conditions under which
people migrated. I refer to these as “origin effects,” and they reflect the general impact of the
country immigrants come from.
Another relevant contextual factor is receiving nation. Immigrants settle in a specific country,
and host societies could play a role in their religious lives. I compare the religiosity of immigrants
in eight different nations, and examine such things as the religiosity of the native population
and the degree of religious pluralism. I call these “destination” factors, and they pertain to the
influence of receiving countries, notwithstanding immigrants’ origins.
Fourth, there are contextual factors that refer to the specific combination of immigrants’
country of origin and country of destination. It could be that an immigrant group is more strongly
religious than other groups in one destination, but less religious than the same group in another
country. Factors that account for such differences relate to the immigrant community or setting,
and include such things as the size of the group. I call these “community” or “setting” factors.
In the following discussion, I fit the hypotheses I have derived from notions discussed in the
literature into this specific migration framework.
Individual Effects
One important individual-level factor associated with religion is age. The general idea ad-
vanced in the religion literature is that people’s religiosity increases with age, although different
interpretations of this association have been proposed. Stark and Bainbridge (1987) argue that
at a higher age, people have stronger fears of death, and religion may therefore become more
important in providing the promise of an afterlife. Other authors (e.g., Chaves 1991; Hout and
Greeley 1990) have proposed a life course model, maintaining that “over the lifespan individu-
als typically marry, settle down in a community, and have children. Presumably they are more
inclined to attend church at each successive stage” (Firebaugh and Harley 1991:495). Although
the role of age is difficult to estimate due to associated cohort or period effects, most researchers
conclude that age has a positive effect on religiosity (Argue, Johnson, and White 1999; Campbell
and Curtis 1994; Firebaugh and Harley 1991). In view of these arguments and findings, I predict
that age has a positive impact on the religious affiliation and participation of immigrants (H1).1
Labor-force status is another individual-level characteristic associated with religiosity. One
argument made in the religion literature is that employed people have less time to be active mem-
bers of a religious community, and are therefore less religious than those who are unemployed or
inactive in the labor market (Iannaccone 1990). In accordance with this idea, a general population
study conducted in 22 countries found that those who are employed have weaker religious beliefs
and attend church less often than those who do not have a job (Campbell and Curtis 1994). Hence,
I predict that employed immigrants are less religious than unemployed or inactive immigrants
(H2).
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A third individual-level factor is sex. In several ways, researchers have hypothesized that
women are more religious than men. Some authors have maintained that, because females are more
risk-averse than males, females are more religious (Miller and Hoffmann 1995). Some suggest
that socialization might predispose women more toward expressive values that are congruent
with religious values and practices, whereas men learn more instrumental values, which are less
consonant with religion (De Vaus and McAllister 1987). In line with both arguments, studies find
that women are more religious than men, irrespective of the measure of religiosity (Miller and
Hoffmann 1995). Because both ideas would apply equally to immigrants, I predict that female
immigrants are more religious than male immigrants (H3).
Education is another possible determinant of religiosity. One influential idea in the literature
is that at schools, people are taught a mechanistic worldview, trained in critical thinking, and that
this mechanistic, critical worldview is difficult to wed with the traditional, religious worldview
(Bruce 1999; Lenski, Lenski, and Nolan 1991; Need and De Graaf 1996; Weber [1922] 1993).
According to this idea, one would expect a negative relationship between schooling and religiosity.
Although a number of studies have found such a negative association (e.g., Kelley and De Graaf
1997), some studies showed no or even a positive relationship between schooling and religiosity
(e.g., Smith, Sikkink, and Bailey 1998; Te Grotenhuis and Scheepers 2001). Veglery (1988) could
not find any relationship between schooling and church membership or attendance among first-
generation Greek immigrants. Although the empirical support is somewhat weak for the supposed
negative association between schooling and religiosity, I hypothesize such an inverse relationship
for the immigrant population (H4).
A final individual-level characteristic considered in this study is marital status; more specifi-
cally, the distinction between married and unmarried people. Scholars generally argue that, while
people’s religiosity influences the likelihood of marriage, union formation also influences peo-
ple’s religiosity. Thornton, Axinn, and Hill (1992) argue that cohabiting people—as opposed to
married people—attending religious services could receive sanctioning by religious leaders and
other adults attending services. Furthermore, Sherkat and Wilson (1995) maintain that religious
endogamy is more common than exogamy and that the partner constitutes a constraint on the
choice of new religious options. Thus, although people partly choose their partner on religious
grounds, they argue that religious norms of the partner also provide an enduring, independent
force in an individual’s religious behavior. In sum, both arguments predict that married people
are more religious than unmarried people. This hypothesis has received ample empirical support
in general population studies (Campbell and Curtis 1994; Iannaccone 1990; Smith, Sikkink, and
Bailey 1998; Thornton, Axinn, and Hill 1992), and in a study of Greek immigrants in New York
(Veglery 1988). In view of these ideas and observations, I predict that married immigrants will
be more religious than unmarried immigrants (H5).
Origin Effects
The religiosity of immigrants could also depend on factors associated with their home country,
over and above their individual-level characteristics. One possibly relevant factor is the country’s
level of modernization. One argument made in the religion literature is that people who grow up in
a modern country are less religious than those who were born in a more traditional country. With
higher levels of education, technology, and more activist ideologies, principles like a spirit of free
inquiry or freedom of thought are stimulated and an active, mechanistic worldview would be more
dominant, leading, in turn, to a lower level of religious commitment (Bruce 1999; Lenski, Lenski,
and Nolan 1991; Need and De Graaf 1996; Weber [1922] 1993). In line with this idea, a cross-
national study of 15 nations showed that a country’s modernization reduces people’s religious
orthodoxy (Kelley and De Graaf 1997). I assume that modernization has an enduring influence
on people’s religion, and hypothesize that immigrants who were born in a modern country have
lesser religious commitment than people who grew up in a less-developed nation (H6).
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I also consider immigrants’ religious upbringing. Because the host countries examined in
this study are all predominantly Christian, social integration in the religious community of the
host society will be presumably higher among immigrants who have a Christian background.2
Christian immigrants are probably stimulated in their religion by the native—Christian—majority,
and also have ample opportunities for practicing their religion. By contrast, immigrants with a
non-Christian background may, due to lack of groups reinforcing their religion and fewer structural
opportunities, gradually lose their attachment to their religion. I therefore predict that immigrants
from Christian origins are more often affiliated with a religion, and attend religious meetings
more frequently, than immigrants from non-Christian origins (H7).
The conditions in the home country at the time of migration can also be important for
understanding the religious commitment of immigrants. The migration literature maintains that
some immigrants move for religious reasons, because of persecution and suppression in their
country of origin (Chiswick 1999). In many non-Western countries, religious freedom is limited
(Marshall 2000); so migrating to a Western country might be induced by the possibility of gaining
religious freedom. Based on these ideas, I predict that immigrants from religiously suppressive
societies are more religious and attend religious meetings more frequently than immigrants from
religiously more open nations (H8).
Destination Effects
Receiving countries can also play a role in the religion of immigrants, irrespective of their
country of origin. One possibly relevant characteristic of host societies is the degree of religious
pluralism. The religion literature suggests that, similar to other types of markets, competition
among religious “firms” tends to lead to the production or supply of religious goods or services
of the kind consumers demand (Stark and Bainbridge 1987). In regulated and monopolized
religious economies, it is maintained, religious firms produce unattractive religious products, badly
marketed. Consequently, religious consumption is expected to be higher in a free, competitive
market than in a monopolistic or oligopolistic religious situation. Although the empirical support
for this idea is, at present, still open to debate (Chaves and Gorski 2001; Stark and Finke 2000;
Voas, Olson, and Crockett 2002), tests have been mainly based on general populations. One
exception is the study by Chaves, Schraeder, and Sprindys (1994). They found that the more
competitive and unregulated the religious environment in an industrialized nation, the more likely
it is in that country for Muslims (many of whom are assumed to be immigrants) to undertake
the hajj (pilgrimage) to Mecca. I assume that in more religiously competitive and pluralistic host
countries, immigrants are more likely to find a religion that suits their needs, and that the religious
“products” will also be of higher quality. Hence, I predict that in more religiously competitive
and pluralistic host countries, immigrants will be more religious (H9).
Host societies may also be important in providing a more or less sacred canopy. In the eight
countries I examine, the religiosity of the native population varies from relatively secular, as in the
Netherlands (where 59 percent stated they had a belief in God in 1991), to more religious nations,
such as the United States (94 percent held such a belief; De Graaf and Need 2000). In the religion
literature, many argue that social groups (e.g., family, friends, school, media, neighborhood) shape
one’s religious environment and are therefore important for determining one’s religion (Berger
1967; Durkheim [1897] 1961; Kelley and De Graaf 1997; Myers 1996; Need and De Graaf 1996;
Te Grotenhuis and Scheepers 2001). Similarly, in the migration literature, studies observe that
people who migrate from one region in a country to another region “accommodate” their beliefs
to the religiosity of their destination (Bibby 1997; Smith, Sikkink, and Bailey 1998; Stump 1984;
Welch and Baltzell 1984; Wuthnow and Christiano 1979). In view of these ideas, I assume that
immigrants’ religious commitment tends to adapt to the religious context of the receiving nation.
Thus, I hypothesize that the religiosity of immigrants is directly related to the religiosity of the
native population (H10).
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The role of the political makeup of receiving societies can also be important for the religion of
immigrants. Some argue that social-democratic parties have more activist and secular ideologies
than Christian and liberal parties (Lenski, Lenski, and Nolan 1991). The more activist and secular
ideologies of social-democratic parties are assumed to lessen people’s attachment to traditional,
religious worldviews. Based on these ideas, I predict that immigrants in societies with a predom-
inantly social-democratic legacy are less religious and attend religious meetings less frequently
than immigrants in societies with predominantly Christian and liberal parties in the government
(H11).
Community Effects
Next to the general role of immigrants’ country of origin and country of destination, the
interplay between origin and destination could also determine religiosity. One such community
factor will be examined in this study, and that is size of the immigrant group. In a way, the size of
the immigrant group is indicative of the cohesiveness of the community. Immigrants maintain their
religion through interactions with other immigrants from their origin country, and the presence of
a large group of co-ethnics in the direct environment strengthens religious beliefs and practices
(Berger 1967; Durkheim [1897] 1961; Kelley and De Graaf 1997). Furthermore, to establish a
religious community and to fund places of worship, a sufficiently large number of co-religionists
in the direct environment is necessary. Based on these ideas, I predict that the larger the relative
size of the immigrant community, the higher the level of their members’ religiosity (H12).
DATA AND MEASUREMENTS
Data
As part of a larger cross-national research project on immigrants (Van Tubergen and Kalmijn
2005; Van Tubergen, Maas, and Flap 2004), existing surveys containing individual-level informa-
tion on the religion of immigrants were collected and standardized. The surveys were combined
into one cross-national data set: the International File of Immigration Surveys (IFIS; Van Tuber-
gen 2004). To obtain survey data that were both high quality and comparable across countries, the
surveys included in the meta-file had to fulfill three criteria. First, for a detailed analysis, the survey
had to contain a sufficiently large number of immigrants (defined as having been born outside the
country of residence), and the survey sample had to be (approximately) nationally representative.
Second, the survey had to have been conducted face-to-face using standard questionnaires with
fixed response categories. Third, the surveys had to contain independent and dependent variables
that were comparable across countries.
I was able to find 20 surveys that met these criteria, for eight Western countries: three
classic immigrant societies (Australia, Canada, and the United States) and five new immigrant
countries in Europe (Belgium, Denmark, Great Britain, Italy, and the Netherlands). The surveys
were conducted between 1974 and 2000, but most took place in the 1990s. Table 1 provides an
overview of the characteristics of the surveys included in the analysis, and the Appendix gives
detailed references for all the data sources used. I selected the population above the age of 18,
and included both males and females. The number of immigrants in the cross-national data set is
38,244.
Two sorts of surveys were collected: some specifically of immigrants and others that were
of the general population. Specific immigrant surveys are designed to study immigrant popula-
tions. They make use of bilingual interviewers and may be translated into the language of the
immigrants. Immigrant groups are oversampled, and the surveys contain detailed information
on issues of migration and integration. Because general population surveys are not designed to
interview immigrant populations, some immigrant groups may be underrepresented. For instance,




Country Year Respondents Survey id Reference
1 Australia 1984 581 AUS84 Kelley, Cushing, and Headey (1984)
2 Australia 1988 2,200 AUS88 AOMA (1988)
3 Australia 1990 1,115 AUS90 Kelley, Bean, and Evans (1990)
4 Australia 1994 159 AUS94 Kelley, Bean, and Evans (1994)
5 Australia 1995 417 AUS95 Kelley, Bean, and Evans (1995)
6 Belgium 1993 1,327 BEL93 Lesthaeghe (1993)
7 Belgium 1996 2,370 BEL96 Lesthaeghe (1996)
8 Canada 1986 852 CAN86 Statistics Canada (1986)
9 Canada 1991 7,168 CAN91 Statistics Canada (1991)
10 Denmark 1988 755 DEN88 DNISR (1988)
11 Denmark 1999 665 DEN99 DNISR (1999)
12 Great Britain 1974 3,042 GB74 Smith (1974)
13 Great Britain 1994 3,658 GB94 Smith and Prior (1994)
14 Italy 1994 2,876 ITA94 Natale, Blangiardo,
and Montanari (1994)
15 Italy 1998 1,807 ITA98 Natale and Strozza (1998)
16 The Netherlands 1994 2,735 NET94 Veenman (1994)
17 The Netherlands 1998 4,435 NET98 Veenman (1998)
18 United States 1988 967 USAnsfh Bumpass and Sweet (1997)
19 United States 1990–2000 814 USAgss Davis, Smith, and Marsden (2000)
20 United States 1990–1998 301 USAnes Sapiro, Rosenstone, and the National
Election Studies (2002)
the General Social Survey in the United States does not make use of bilingual interviewers, and is
therefore considered nationally representative only for adults who speak English well enough to
understand the interview (Davis, Smith, and Marsden 2000). Because language proficiency might
be associated with religiosity, I have taken the difference between specific and general surveys
into account in the analysis.
Dependent Variables
I have analyzed two aspects of religiosity: religious affiliation and religious participation.
Religious affiliation was standardized into a dichotomous variable:
(1) Affiliated with a religion (88.8 percent)
(0) Not affiliated with a religion (11.2 percent).
Out of the 8 countries and 20 surveys in the meta-file, 7 countries and 14 surveys contained
information on religious participation (the surveys for Denmark did not have questions on religious
attendance). To render the results as comparable as possible, I standardized the detailed answer
categories in these surveys into two more-general categories:
(1) Attending religious meetings once a week or more (29.7 percent)
(0) Attending religious meetings less than once a week (70.3 percent).
I did not detect problems in comparing the answer categories of both variables because all
surveys in the meta-file contain a fixed response category for no religious affiliation and for
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TABLE 2
OVERVIEW OF SURVEY QUESTIONS REGARDING RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION
AND RELIGIOUS ATTENDANCE
Survey Religious Affiliation Religious Attendance
AUS84 What is your religious denomination? Is it
Protestant, Catholic, some other religion, no
religion, or what?
How often do you attend religious services?
AUS88 Do you think of yourself as having a religion
or faith?
n.a.
AUS90 What is your religious denomination now? How often do you attend religious services?
AUS94 What is your religious denomination now? How often do you attend religious services
now?
AUS95 What is your religious denomination now? How often do you attend religious services
now?
BEL93 What is your religious affiliation? Do you attend the mosque sometimes?
BEL96 What is your religious affiliation? Do you attend the mosque sometimes?
CAN86 What if any is your religion? How often do you attend services?
CAN91 What is this person’s religion? n.a.
DEN88 What is your religion? n.a.
DEN99 What is your religion? n.a.
GB74 What is your religion or church? How often do you go to
church/mosque/temple?
GB94 Do you have a religion or church? How often do you attend services or prayer
meetings or go to a place of worship?
ITA94 What is your religion? n.a.
ITA98 What is your religion? Do you practice your religion in a place of
worship (church, mosque, synagogue)?
NET94 Do you think of yourself as part of a particular
religious community, church, or religion?
n.a.
NET98 Do you think of yourself as part of a particular
religious community, church, or religion?
How often do you attend religious services
now?
USAgss What is your religious preference? Is it
Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, some other
religion, or no religion?
How often do you attend religious services?
USAnsfh What is your religious preference? How often do you attend religious services?
(number of times per year)
USAnes Do you ever think of yourself as part of a
particular church or denomination?
Do you ever attend religious services, apart
from occasional weddings, baptisms, or
funerals?
Note: Questions have been translated into English where necessary.
attending religious meetings once a week or more. Some difficulties, however, arose in regard
to the comparability of question formulations. Table 2 provides an overview of the wording of
the survey questions regarding religious affiliation and participation (translated into English, if
necessary). It shows that there are no apparent differences that might systematically affect the
comparability of responses in regard to religious participation.3 It also shows that the more or less
standard way of asking immigrants about their religious affiliation was “What is your religion?”
However, there are two differences in the wording of the question that deviate from this standard
and that might affect the reliability of making cross-national comparisons.
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First of all, in most of the surveys, the question tends to assume that people have a religion
(“What is your religion?”), but there are surveys in which the questions do not assume this (“Do
you have a religion?”). The first kind of survey uses a so-called one-step method to ask directly for
religious affiliation (e.g., Catholic, Protestant, Muslim, other religion, no religion). The second
uses a “two-step method”: first, respondents are asked if they have a religion, and only if they
answer affirmatively are they asked to specify what their religion is. Although both kinds of
surveys provide a fixed answer category for having “no religious affiliation,” the wording of the
question could have a systematic effect on the response. It is possible that one-step questions
yield higher levels of religious affiliation than two-step questions. In order to deal with this bias
when comparing surveys, I included a dummy variable in the analysis that exactly represents this
difference.
A second possible source of bias is related to the difference between “religion” vis-a`-vis
“religious denomination.” In most surveys, respondents were asked for their religion, but in some
surveys, respondents were asked for their religious denomination. While questions regarding
religion are more of an indication of self-identified religious affiliation, questions in respect of
denomination are more directed toward actual membership. Although people who identify with a
religion are likely to be members of a certain religious community and people who are members
of a religious community are likely to consider themselves religiously affiliated, these variables
are not necessarily the same. I have therefore included a dummy variable that represents this
difference.
Independent Variables
The data set contains independent variables related to individuals, origins, destinations, and
communities. I discuss each variable briefly, below.
Schooling. Total years of full-time education. For surveys that had no direct measure of years
of schooling, I relied on educational level and computed the average number of years needed to
obtain that level, using the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED-97; OECD
1999).
Labor-force status. I constructed a dummy variable for employed versus all other (unem-
ployed and inactive).
Sex. Females are the reference category.
Age. I measured age in years and estimated midpoints for surveys using broader categories.
Marital status. I constructed two categories: married and unmarried (divorced, separated,
single).
Modernization in the country of origin. I relied on gross domestic product (GDP) as a measure
of economic development and modernization. It was measured in constant dollars per capita for
1980 and was obtained from OECD (2000).
Christian origin. As a measure of religious background, I set up a dummy variable to indicate
countries of origin with more than 50 percent Christian adherents at the end of the 20th century
(Brierley 1997).
Religious affiliation. In addition to a contextual-level variable of religious upbringing, I
constructed a variable at the individual level that measures whether people are affiliated to Christian
religion, a non-Christian religion, or not affiliated to a religion. Note that this variable will be
used only in the analyses of religious attendance.
Religious suppression. As a proxy for religious suppression in the country of origin, I relied
on information collected by Freedom House on political rights and civil liberties (Karatnycky and
Piano 2002). Political rights varied from 1 (free and fair elections, power for opposition parties,
etc.) to 7 (oppressive regime, civil war). Civil liberties varied from 1 (freedom of expression
and religion, free economic activity) to 7 (no religious freedom, political terror, and no free
association). I used the sum score for each country (2–14) and computed averages for the 1972–
1980 period.
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Religious concentration. I measured religious competition and diversity with the Herfindahl
index of religious concentration: Hj = P2ij , where P represents each religious family (or specific
denomination) divided by the total number of church members in a country, i represents the index
of summation that runs over all religious categories in country j. H equals the probability that
any two randomly selected persons belong to the same religion. The index was multiplied by
100, and ranges (theoretically) from 0 to 100. The measure and the country scores were taken
from Iannaccone (1991) and refer to the religious situation in the 1970s and the beginning of the
1980s.4
Religiosity of the host society. To measure the religiosity of the native population, I have used
figures on religious attendance, obtained from the European and World Values Studies, conducted
in the period 1981–1984 and 1990 (Barker, Halman, and Vloet 1992; Inglehart et al. 2000). I used
the question: “Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often do you attend
religious services these days?” and averaged the percentages that participate once a week or more
for the two study periods.
Social democracy. As a measure of the political makeup of a country, I counted the number
of years in which social-democratic parties were present in the government. The annual presence
of social-democratic parties in the government was rated as 1 when they formed a one-party
government, 0.5 when they joined a coalition, and 0 when they were absent from the government.
Information on the presence of social-democratic parties in the government was obtained from
various Internet sources. Because most of the surveys included in the analysis were conducted in
the 1990s, I considered the political situation in the 1980s. An exception to this is the situation of
immigrants who were interviewed in Great Britain in 1974, where I computed averages for the
1970–1980 period.
Relative group size. I constructed a variable for the size of an immigrant group relative to the
total population of the host society in the 1980s and 1990s. I used the 1981 census of Australia
(Australian Bureau of Statistics 1981), the 1991 and 1996 census of Canada (Statistics Canada
1991, 1996), the 1980 and 1990 census of the United States (United States Census Bureau 1980,
1990), and the European Union Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat 2002) to compute aggregate-level
information on group size.
Descriptive statistics for the independent variables are presented in Table 3.5
Methods
I used multilevel techniques to test the hypotheses. At the “lowest,” or micro, level, religious
affiliation and religious participation are affected by individual characteristics such as age and
education. Immigrants are then nested in the macro-level components of both an origin and a des-
tination, which affect the odds of religious affiliation and weekly religious attendance at the same
level. In other words, the multilevel structure is nonhierarchical and the so-called cross-classified
models have been used (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002; Snijders and Bosker 1999). Because the
variance of communities is tapped by the variance of origins and the variance of destinations, it is
not independently assessed; however, I estimate community effects at the appropriate origin-by-
destination level. I made use of Markov Chain Monte Carlo estimation procedures provided in
the software program MlwiN (Browne 2002). Because I have included survey characteristics, and
I have multiple surveys within destination countries, I have used country of origin as the origin
level and surveys as the destination level.
RESULTS
Descriptive Analyses
I start with a descriptive overview of immigrants’ religiosity. Table 4 presents the results for
religious affiliation, and Table 5 for religious participation. Note that in these descriptive analyses,
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TABLE 3
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Range Mean Standard Deviation
Individual
Age 19–97 40.52 15.05
Employed 0/1 0.56 0.50
Male 0/1 0.57 0.49
Schooling 0–24 9.66 5.30
Married 0/1 0.65 0.48
Religious affiliationa
No religious affiliation 0/1 0.11 0.32
Christian 0/1 0.42 0.49
Other religion 0/1 0.47 0.50
Origin
GDP per capita (in 1,000 USD) 0.10–29.10 5.04 6.33
Predominantly Christian 0/1 0.56 0.50
Political and religious suppression 2–14 8.65 3.96
Destination (surveys)
Religious concentration 12–98 48.65 32.74
Religiosity (% religious attendance at least once a week) 3–43 25.70 11.59
Social-democratic history (past 10 years) 0–6 2.90 2.43
Community
Relative group size (%) 0.00–9.71 0.18 0.67
Survey characteristics
Migration survey 0/1 0.55 0.51
Two-step question 0/1 0.30 0.47
Denomination 0/1 0.25 0.44
aVariable used in subset for analysis of religious attendance.
Note: Statistics computed at corresponding level.
survey differences (e.g., sampling, questioning) are not taken into account. Hence, the results need
to be interpreted with some caution.
Both tables suggest pronounced differences in religiosity among immigrants of different
countries of origin. For example, Table 4 shows that the percent affiliated with a religion is above
95 for immigrants from India, Italy, Morocco, Poland, and Turkey. Religious affiliation is much
lower among immigrants from Germany (83 percent), Great Britain (81 percent), and the former
Yugoslavia (84 percent). Origin differences are also found with regard to religious participation
(Table 5). Among immigrants from Poland, 51 percent attend religious meetings at least once a
week. In contrast, only 13 percent of immigrants from Great Britain attend religious meetings
once a week or more. Except for immigrants from Italy, the five origin groups with high religious
affiliation (India, Morocco, Poland, Turkey) also attend religious meetings frequently.
The descriptive figures also give evidence to suggest that immigrants’ religiosity differs
between host societies. Religious affiliation among immigrants is particularly high in Belgium (98
percent), Denmark (93 percent), Italy (94 percent), and Great Britain (95 percent). It is much lower
in Australia (80 percent) and Canada (81 percent). In Australia, levels of religious participation
among immigrants are also much lower. Of all immigrants in that country, only 13 percent attend
religious meetings at least once a week. Much higher levels of religious participation are observed
in the Netherlands (33 percent), Great Britain (34 percent), and the United States (35 percent).
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TABLE 4
RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION AMONG IMMIGRANTS IN EIGHT WESTERN
COUNTRIES, 1974–2000 (%)
Country of Origin
Country of Great Yugoslavia Mean All
Destination Germany Britain India Italy Morocco Poland Turkey (ex-) Groups
Australia 70 77 91 93 . 93 . 86 80
Belgium – – – – 98 – 99 – 98
Canada 87 85 . 98 – 94 – – 81
Denmark – – – – – – 96 83 93
Italy – – – – 96 98 – 83 94
The Netherlands – – – – 98 – 97 – 87
Great Britain – – 98 – – – – – 95
United States 85 82 87 87 – 96 – – 89
Mean 83 81 98 96 97 96 98 84 89
Note: “.” = less than 50 respondents.
TABLE 5
RELIGIOUS PARTICIPATION AMONG IMMIGRANTS IN SEVEN WESTERN
COUNTRIES, 1974–2000 (% ATTENDING RELIGIOUS MEETINGS AT LEAST
ONCE A WEEK)
Country of Origin
Country of Great Yugoslavia Mean All
Destination Britain India Italy Morocco Poland Turkey (ex-) Groups
Australia 12 – – 11 – – – 8 13
Belgium – – – – 31 – 28 – 29
Canada 30 20 – 29 – – – – 25
Italy – – – – 20 54 – 26 29
The Netherlands – – – – 49 – 49 – 33
Great Britain – – 35 – – – – – 34
United States 20 21 24 35 – 38 – – 35
Mean 21 13 34 22 34 51 35 22 30
Note: “.” = less than 50 respondents.
Next to the role of origins and destinations, Tables 4 and 5 also provide some clues to
the influence of the immigrant community. With respect to religious affiliation, an example is
the German community in Australia. Of the Germans who migrated to Australia, 70 percent
are affiliated with a religion. This is below the average religious affiliation of Germans across
all destinations (which is 83 percent), and also below the average religious affiliation of all
immigrants in Australia (which is 80 percent). Thus, the religiosity of the German community in
Australia deviates from the general differences among origin countries and destination countries.
To give another illustration, consider the Moroccan and Turkish immigrant communities in the
Netherlands. In both communities, 49 percent attend religious meetings at least once a week. This
is clearly above the mean attendance of these origin groups across all destinations (which is about
34–35 percent), and also above the average attendance of all immigrant groups in the Netherlands
(33 percent).
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Decomposition of Variance
Table 6 presents the variance components, obtained from cross-classified multilevel logistic
models with random intercepts for immigrants’ origin and destination. I computed two different
models: one in which countries are treated as destinations, and another in which surveys make up
the destination level. Note that these are empty models, that is, without the inclusion of explanatory
variables. Furthermore, I note that the logistic distribution for the level-one residual implies a
variance of π2/3 = 3.29 (Snijders and Bosker 1999:224). The total variance is therefore composed
of variance between individuals σ 2, variance between countries of origin τ b00, and variance
between destinations (i.e., countries or surveys) τ c00. Although it is possible to examine the random
interaction τd 00 between country of origin and country of destination (i.e., community effects),
Raudenbush and Bryk (2002) show that the cell sample sizes in these kinds of model specifications
are often not sufficient to distinguish the variance attributable to the random interaction effect
τd 00 from the within-cell variance σ 2. Hence, I refrained from estimating the variance at the
community level.
It is tempting to assess the variation at the macro level for both religious affiliation and
religious attendance. This can be obtained by computing the intra-unit correlation coefficient
ρbc = (τ b00 + τ c00)/(τ b00 + τ c00 + σ 2), where σ 2 is fixed to 3.29. In the case where countries
make up the destination component, ρbc is 0.31 (i.e., (1.311 + 0.158)/(1.311 + 0.158 + 3.29))
for religious affiliation, and 0.21 for religious attendance. This implies that almost a third of the
individual differences in religious affiliation, and almost a quarter of the individual differences
in religious attendance, can be attributed to the country of origin and the country of destination.
More technically formulated, it means that the correlations between outcomes of two (randomly
chosen) immigrants who are from the same country of origin and who live in the same country of
destination are 0.31 (religious affiliation) and 0.21 (religious attendance). When surveys make up
the destination level, the figures are 0.33 and 0.26, respectively. This suggests that macro factors
are important for understanding the religiosity of immigrants, and somewhat more important for
religious affiliation than for religious attendance.
Decomposing the macro variation into two components results in a proportion of the total
variation that is due to the country of origin ρb (i.e., τ b00/(τ b00 + τ c00 + σ 2)), and a proportion
of the total variation that is due to the country of destination ρc (i.e., τ c00/(τ b00 + τ c00 + σ 2)).
Interestingly, when countries make up the destination level, ρb (0.28) is much higher than ρc (0.03)
with respect to religious affiliation, but ρb (0.10) is slightly smaller than ρc (0.11) for religious
participation. When surveys are used as destinations, the difference with respect to religious
participation is more pronounced (i.e., ρb = 0.09, ρc = 0.17). This suggests that the country of
origin is more important than the country of destination for understanding immigrants’ religious
affiliation, but that the opposite is true for understanding the religious attendance of immigrants.
Note, finally, that the total variation is somewhat larger (and the standard error somewhat smaller)
when surveys make up the destination level than when countries are used. This is an additional
argument to test the hypotheses with models in which surveys make up the destination level.
Hypotheses Testing
Table 7 presents the results of the multivariate multilevel logistic regression analyses of
religion. Model 1 shows the results for religious affiliation and Model 2 and Model 3 pertain to
religious attendance.6 In Model 3, religious affiliation is included, for two reasons. First, in addition
to examining the role of having a Christian background at the contextual level (i.e., predominantly
Christian origin country vis-a`-vis mainly non-Christian origin country), this additional model
allows us to assess the influence of a Christian background at the individual level (i.e., Christian
affiliation vis-a`-vis non-Christian). This is important because the macro-level concept does not
consider patterns of selective emigration: it is possible that minorities having a non-Christian
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TABLE 6
VARIANCE COMPONENTS FROM RANDOM INTERCEPT MODELS WITHOUT
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES, CROSS-CLASSIFIED MULTILEVEL LOGISTIC
REGRESSION OF RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION AND RELIGIOUS ATTENDANCE
Religious Affiliation Religious Attendance
Variance Component Standard Error Variance Component Standard Error
Countries as destinations
Country of origin 1.311 (0.231) 0.402 (0.089)




Country of origin 1.286 (0.227) 0.392 (0.085)
Surveys 0.343 (0.145) 0.738 (0.328)
Individual 3.290 3.290
Total 4.919 4.357
religion are migrating from predominantly Christian countries (or vice versa). Second, Model
3 provides the opportunity to examine whether the effects presented in Model 2 persist after
religious affiliation is taken into account (i.e., affiliated with a religion vis-a`-vis not affiliated with a
religion). In other words, the model assesses whether the effects are either indirect (i.e., influencing
the religious affiliation of immigrants) or direct (i.e., influencing the religious attendance of
immigrants).
I discuss the findings under five different headings below: individual effects; origin effects;
destination effects; community effects; and survey effects.
Individual Effects
What about the impact of individual characteristics? First of all, I predicted that age has a
positive impact on the religiosity of immigrants (H1). My analysis supports this hypothesis. Age
has a significant positive effect on the chance of religious affiliation, and on the likelihood of
attending a religious meeting once a week or more. The magnitude of the effect is 0.018 (Model
1) for religious affiliation, and 0.026 (Model 2) or 0.025 (Model 3) for religious attendance. In
other words, with each successive year, the expected odds of religious affiliation increases by
1.8 percent (i.e., 1 − e0.018), and the odds of weekly religious attendance by 2.5–2.6 percent.
The second hypothesis stated that employed immigrants are less religious than immigrants
who are unemployed or inactive (H2). The analyses of religious affiliation and religious attendance
are in line with this prediction. Thus, employed immigrants are significantly less often affiliated
with a religion, and attend religious meetings significantly less often than immigrants who are
unemployed or inactive.
The differences observed by sex are intriguing. I predicted that male immigrants would be
less often affiliated with a religion and would attend religious meetings less often than female
immigrants (H3). In line with this prediction, I find that religious affiliation is indeed considerably
lower among males. The odds that female immigrants are affiliated with a religion are 53 percent
higher than the comparable odds for male immigrants. However, the supposed lower levels of
attendance among males cannot be supported. According to Model 2, male and female immigrants
participate in weekly meetings at an equal rate. Moreover, Model 3 shows that immigrant men
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TABLE 7
CROSS-CLASSIFIED MULTILEVEL LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF RELIGIOUS
AFFILIATION AND RELIGIOUS ATTENDANCE AMONG IMMIGRANTS IN EIGHT
WESTERN COUNTRIES, 1974–2000
Religious Affiliation Religious Attendance
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coefficients S.E. Coefficients S.E. Coefficients S.E.
Constant 2.606∗∗ (0.207) −2.922∗∗ (0.287) −5.877∗∗ (0.385)
Individual effects
Age 0.018∗∗ (0.002) 0.026∗∗ (0.001) 0.025∗∗ (0.002)
Employed −0.233∗∗ (0.040) −0.228∗∗ (0.041) −0.220∗∗ (0.040)
Male −0.423∗∗ (0.040) 0.067 (0.043) 0.123∗∗ (0.043)
Schooling −0.028∗∗ (0.004) −0.017∗∗ (0.004) −0.015∗∗ (0.004)




Other religion 3.143∗∗ (0.161)
Origin effects
GDP per capita (in 1,000
USD)
−0.065∗∗ (0.023) −0.046∗∗ (0.017) −0.023 (0.018)
Predominantly Christian −0.030 (0.179) 0.514∗∗ (0.172) 0.215 (0.150)
Political and religious
suppression
−0.021 (0.019) −0.001 (0.023) 0.023 (0.028)
Destination effects
Religious concentration −0.002 (0.006) 0.002 (0.008) −0.017∗∗ (0.006)
Religiosity (% religious
attendance at least once
a week)
0.015∗ (0.007) 0.025∗ (0.011) 0.025 (0.013)
Social-democratic history
(past 10 years)
−0.108∗ (0.049) −0.146∗∗ (0.043) −0.090 (0.090)
Community effects












Origin 140 113 113
Destination (surveys) 20 14 14
Community 272 189 189
Individual 38,244 19,548 19,548
∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01 (two-tailed tests).
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more often attend religious meetings than immigrant women. Combined together, these results
show that religious attendance among immigrant men is higher than that of immigrant women,
once the higher percentage unaffiliated to a religion of immigrant men is taken into account.
Another individual-level factor examined is schooling. H4 predicted that schooling has a
negative impact on religious affiliation and religious participation. This study indeed finds a
significant inverse relationship between schooling and religiosity. This means that immigrants
with a higher education are less often affiliated with a religion, and attend religious meetings less
often, than less-educated immigrants. Note that the magnitude of the effect is somewhat larger
with respect to religious affiliation than with respect to religious attendance, and that the effect of
schooling on attendance persists even after religious affiliation is taken into account.
A final individual-level factor considered in this article is marital status. I predicted that
immigrants who are married are more religious than those who are unmarried (H5). In accordance
with this hypothesis, I find significantly higher levels of religious affiliation and participation
among married immigrants.
Origin Effects
In regard to the role of the country of origin, I first of all hypothesized that immigrants who
were born in a modern country would be less religious than immigrants born in a less-modern
nation (H6). In line with this idea, I find that immigrants from countries with a higher GDP per
capita are less often affiliated with a religion. The magnitude of the effect is substantial. For
instance, the odds that immigrants from the least economically developed country (i.e., $100 in
1980; Table 3) are affiliated with a religion are almost seven times larger than the comparable
odds for immigrants from the most developed country (i.e., $29,100). Model 2 shows that GDP
per capita also has a significantly negative influence on religious attendance. Interestingly, when
taking religious affiliation into account, the effect halves and becomes insignificant (Model 3).
This suggests that GDP per capita has no direct influence on attendance; rather, the effect is
indirect: immigrants from more modern nations are more often affiliated to a religion, and for
that reason attend religious meetings more frequently.
I further predicted that immigrants with a Christian background would be more religious
than non-Christian immigrants (H7). This hypothesis is partly confirmed in the analysis. I do
not find that immigrants from predominantly Christian countries are significantly more often
affiliated with a religion. However, Model 2 shows the predicted effect on religious attendance.
Immigrants from predominantly Christian countries attend religious meetings significantly more
frequently than immigrants from non-Christian societies. Emigration flows can be selective, with
non-Christian people emigrating from predominantly Christian countries (and vice versa); thus
it is important to compare the results of Model 2 and Model 3. It appears that the effect of
religious origin becomes insignificant once religious affiliation at the individual level is taken into
account. The reason for this is that immigrants from predominantly Christian countries are mainly
Christians, and Christian immigrants participate more often than non-Christian immigrants. This
finding is in line with theoretical expectations.
A final origin factor I consider is the condition under which people migrated. H8 predicted
that religious suppression in the sending nation varies directly with immigrants’ religiosity. There
is no evidence to support this hypothesis, however.
Destination Effects
Another set of hypotheses pertained to the role of host societies. I hypothesized that the
religious concentration in the receiving country has a negative effect on immigrants’ religion
(H9). I find support for this hypothesis with respect to religious attendance, but not for religious
affiliation. The significantly inverse relationship between religious concentration and attendance
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appears after religious affiliation is taken into account. In sum, I find that in more pluralistic and
religiously competitive host societies, immigrants are not more often affiliated with a religion, but,
once religious affiliation is controlled, immigrants participate more frequently than do immigrants
in religiously monopolized countries. Note that it is not surprising that religious concentration
has no effect on affiliation, since it is less constrained by structural forces.
The hypotheses also predicted that the more religious the native population, the higher will
be the religiosity of immigrants (H10). I find positive evidence for this hypothesis, although the
evidence is not strong. Model 1 shows that the higher the percentage of natives in a country
attending religious meetings once a week or more, the more often immigrants in that country are
affiliated to a religion. The religious participation of the native population also has the predicted
positive effect on religious attendance of immigrants, although the effect is marginally significant
in Model 3 (t = 1.92).
The final characteristic of destination countries examined here is their political makeup. It
was hypothesized that the presence of social-democratic parties in the government negatively
affects the religiosity of immigrants. I find that immigrants in countries with a social-democratic
legacy are indeed less often affiliated to a religion than immigrants in countries with a dominant
Christian or liberal history. In addition, Model 2 shows that the presence of social-democratic
parties in the government reduces the religious attendance of immigrants. However, on close
inspection, it appears that political parties influence the attendance of immigrants only indirectly,
by decreasing the rate affiliated to a religion. Model 3 shows that, once religious affiliation is
controlled, social-democratic legacy has no direct effect on religious attendance of immigrants.
Community Effects
Besides contextual factors that relate either to the country of origin or to the country of
destination, I also hypothesized the effects of a combination of these (i.e., community effects). I
predicted that the size of the immigrant community would be positively related to the religiosity
of immigrants in that community (H12). However, my analysis does not support this idea. I do
not find a significant effect of the relative size of the immigrant group on religious affiliation or on
weekly church participation. In various other models (not presented here), I examined quadratic
specifications of group size as well as the bivariate relationship between group size and religion.
None of these models showed a significant effect, however.
Survey Effects
A final note on survey effects: it appears that surveys that are specially designed to examine
immigrant populations show somewhat higher levels of religiosity among immigrants than do
surveys of general populations. In addition, I find that surveys that use a one-step question to
ask for religious affiliation have higher levels of affiliation than surveys using a two-step method.
According to my analysis, asking for denomination or religion does not play a role. In additional
analyses, not presented here, I left out these survey variables. This did not change the substantive
interpretations, which suggests that although survey effects play a role in “predicting” the degree
of religiosity, the regression effects, which are relevant for testing the hypotheses, are quite stable.
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
I started this article by arguing that in the sociology of religion, little attention has been paid
to the study of immigrants. I developed a specific migration framework, in which the religiosity
of immigrants is an outcome of individual characteristics (individual effects), the country of
origin (origin effects), the country of destination (destination effects), and the combination of
origin and destination (community or setting effects). Using notions discussed in the religion and
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immigration literature, I proposed a number of factors that fit this conceptual apparatus. Making
use of 20 surveys conducted in eight Western countries, I tested the hypotheses with multilevel
techniques and controlled for survey effects.
In contrast to case studies that focus on a single immigrant group in a single country, the
specific migration framework adopted here looks at multiple groups in multiple countries. In this
way, the religious experience of such diverse groups as the Mexicans in the United States, Turks
in the Netherlands, or Pakistanis in Great Britain can be compared. One valuable insight that came
out of this comparison is that immigrants’ country of origin is more important than the country
of destination for understanding immigrants’ religious affiliation, but that the opposite is true for
understanding the religious attendance of immigrants.
Another conclusion of this study is that across the different immigrants, ethnic groups, and
countries, several general patterns of immigrants’ religiosity emerge. It is important to confront
these observations with ideas proposed in the existing literature. One way of assessing theories
in the sociology of religion is to apply them to a new research area or population and examine
their empirical success (Jelen 2002). Whereas the sociology of religion has focused mainly on
Judeo-Christian beliefs in Western nations (Turner 1983), immigrants originate from all over the
world, including both highly religious and more secular nations, poor and rich, Christian and
non-Christian. The patterns observed in my study generally concur with accepted insights of the
sociology of religion, and these insights therefore have a broad empirical scope. On the other
hand, some findings of my study contradict earlier observations in the sociology of religion and
thereby challenge the generalizability of well-known ideas.
To start with the confirmations, I find that a number of individual-level factors are important.
It appears that immigrants’ religiosity increases with age and decreases with schooling. I also find
that religiosity is lower among employed immigrants than among inactive and unemployed immi-
grants, and that married immigrants are more religious than unmarried immigrants. Because these
relationships have been documented in previous studies on general populations, one could argue
that they reflect certain “general” mechanisms at the individual level. Thus, while these patterns
have been observed earlier among native, Western populations (i.e., predominantly Christian,
wealthy) this study finds that they can be extended theoretically and empirically to the immigrant
population (i.e., including non-Christian, poorer groups).
Also in line with theories proposed in the sociology of religion, I find that the religion
of immigrants is an outcome of several contextual factors. Modernization theory (Bruce 1999;
Lenski, Lenski, and Nolan 1991; Need and De Graaf 1996; Weber [1922] 1993) received support
in my study with the observation that religiosity is lower among immigrants who were born
in modern countries, and among immigrants who live in receiving countries with a stronger
presence of social-democratic parties in the government. In accordance with social-integration
theory (Berger 1967; Durkheim [1897] 1961; Kelley and De Graaf 1997; Myers 1996; Need and
De Graaf 1996; Te Grotenhuis and Scheepers 2001), Christian immigrants more often attend
religious services than non-Christian immigrants, and the religiosity of the receiving context
positively affects the religiosity of immigrants. Finally, I find some support for the religious
market theory (Iannaccone 1991; Stark and Bainbridge 1987; Stark and Finke 2000): the religious
concentration of the receiving nation is inversely related with immigrants’ religiosity.
This study finds some unexpected results that challenge theoretical insights in the sociology
of religion. Perhaps the most important finding of this study that contradicts theoretical consider-
ations is the male-female pattern. In general population studies, it is well known and consistently
found that women are more religious than men, irrespective of the measure of religiosity. Al-
though I find that female immigrants are indeed more often affiliated with a religion than male
immigrants, immigrant women did not attend religious services more often than immigrant men.
On the contrary, once the higher percentage of immigrant men not affiliated to a religion is taken
into account, I find that immigrant men more frequently attend religious meetings than immi-
grant women. One explanation for this unexpected finding is that in my study all religions were
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taken together without considering differences between them. It is possible that specific religious
practices and prescriptions are relevant here. For instance, some studies suggest that in Muslim
communities, males attend religious services more often than females (Horrie and Chippindale
1990). Further research that examines the impact of these and other theological differences on
the religious practices of immigrants is therefore to be encouraged.
I could not find significant effects for several contextual factors. Contrary to expectations, I
found no effect of the size of the ethnic community on immigrants’ religiosity. Although this ob-
servation challenges social-integration theory, methodological explanations for not finding such
an effect are more plausible. The reason is that group size is only indirectly related to the more
relevant idea of the cohesiveness of the immigrant community. In more close-knit communities,
religious behavior can be better controlled and sanctioned. Although the cohesiveness is partly
influenced by the size of the immigrant group, it is also strongly determined by spatial segre-
gation. In a similar way, another observation not in line with theory can be explained. Contrary
to expectations, my study finds that religious suppression in the sending nation has no effect
on immigrants’ religiosity. However, I had to rely on a rather indirect measure of religious sup-
pression (i.e., violation of political rights and civil liberties). Because of these methodological
problems, not finding the predicted patterns at the contextual level does not imply that they are not
there.
Further research could improve the present study in at least two different ways. Method-
ologically, subsequent studies could include more precise measures of the cohesiveness of the
immigrant community and of religious suppression in the country of origin. In addition, it is
important to overcome problems associated with “Small N’s and Big Conclusions” (Lieberson
1991), and to expand the number of receiving countries examined. Theoretically, it would be
important to theorize about and empirically examine the role of individual-level factors that are
immigrant-specific. These are factors such as age at migration, length of residence, ethnic inter-
marriage, and language proficiency. Although the importance of these factors is well established
in studies on immigrants’ economic incorporation, little is known if they affect immigrants’ reli-
giosity as well, and thereby provide a valuable supplement to the specific migration framework
developed here.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I am grateful for comments from Henk Flap, Ineke Maas, Loredana Ivan, Nan Dirk de Graaf, and anonymous
reviewers and the editor of the Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion on earlier drafts of this article.
NOTES
1. For the sake of simplicity, I assume that religious affiliation and religious participation are affected in a similar way
by the individual and contextual factors proposed here.
2. Note that this idea is theoretically a community factor. When, for instance, predominantly Muslim destinations are
considered, Christian immigrants would be expected to have a lower religious commitment than Muslim immigrants.
However, because I only examine Christian destination countries in this article, I treat this idea as an origin effect
instead of a community effect.
3. The surveys used for Belgium asked for mosque attendance, because only Muslims participated in that
survey.
4. It is important to emphasize that the use of the Herfindahl index in this article does not involve the problems
addressed by Voas, Olson, and Crockett (2002). They argued that relationships between measures of pluralism (such
as the Herfindahl index) and religious involvement are due to a mathematical artifact, rendering a nonzero correlation
by chance alone. Because I use the religious pluralism of the total population (immigrants are only a small part of
the population) and in a time period before most immigrants entered the receiving nation, the religious behavior of
immigrants is unaffected by this mathematical artifact. Note, further, that the religious concentration measure I use
strongly correlates (r = 0.91) with an alternative measure of competition suggested by Chaves and Cann (1992),
which indicates the degree to which states regulate religion.
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5. I computed bivariate correlations at the macro level to examine the association between macro-level predictors.
Correlations are below 0.50, and the results are therefore not severely biased by multicollinearity.
6. I did not inspect changes in the effects of macro-level variables or changes in variance components after adding
micro- and macro-level variables, nor did I inspect deviance statistics. The reason is that in multilevel models with
dichotomous outcomes, the residual level-one variance is fixed and the coefficients of the macro-level variables, as
well as the variance at the macro level, tend to increase after micro-level variables with strong effects have been
included. Multilevel models are appropriate, however, for testing micro- and macro-level hypotheses (Snijders and
Bosker 1999).
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